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Since people with low incomes do not have access to ﬁnancial institutions, and in
most developing countries only public workers beneﬁt from the services of public
banks, the poor and private workers with low incomes cannot borrow from these
public banks. Hence, microﬁnancial institutions (MFIs) have become the answer to
those who cannot beneﬁt from the ﬁnancial services of the public banks. This study
compares the performance and outreach aspect of the MFIs in Cameroon against the
African benchmark. Furthermore, it investigates if there is a trade-off between perfor-
mance and outreach. A total of six selected MFIs with branches all over Cameroon
were chosen for this study. Using the difference of mean test, the ﬁndings of the
study revealed that generally, the MFIs in Cameroon implemented a low cost strategy
and are heavily exposed to default risk. We also concluded a trade-off between the
performance and outreach factors. MFIs in Cameroon are more focused on making
proﬁts, instead of reaching out to the poorest of the poor in the communities.
Keywords: microﬁnance; Cameroon; outreach; performance analysis; poor; ﬁnancial
insitutions
JEL classiﬁcation: G00, G10, G20, G30, H30
1. Introduction
Poverty and lack of ﬁnancial resources in most developing countries especially in West
and Central Africa is a major problem. The existence of poverty in a majority of the
population in Cameroon has limited the establishment of individual-, family- and com-
munity-owned businesses both on a small and medium size scale. With corruption and
embezzlement resulting in unequal distribution of foreign aid and other ﬁnancial support
made by the government to encourage the establishment of small and medium size
enterprises (SMEs), most people have to now turn to banks for ﬁnancial aid and loans.
Denying people the access to ﬁnancial markets is the main generator and reason for
poverty with many consequences such as lack of good healthcare facilities, education,
nutrition and others. The population living below the poverty line and those with low
incomes do not have access to the services of the public and commercial banks in
developing countries. These people cannot be served from the public banks because
they do not work with the governments and do not have the capital to create accounts
with the commercial banks. In addition, most poor people have few or no assets that
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can be secured by a bank as collateral (Mokoro Nyaoga, Magutu, Khoya, & Onsongo
2010). A new alternative way of providing credit to people living in poverty and
vulnerable economic situations is microﬁnance.
Research has shown that the depth of outreach of microﬁnancial services increases
more rapidly than public commercial banking services (Martzys, 2006). In Cameroon,
no ideal working model has been put in place to evaluate the outreach and performance
of these MFIs. The COBAC3 regulation on microﬁnance institutions (MFIs) set on
April 2002 and implemented from 2007 restructured the sector of microﬁnance in
Cameroon and henceforth forced out illegal, unqualiﬁed and unprofessional MFIs
(Rufﬁng, 2009).
Several MFIs have been established and have been working towards resolving the
credit access problem of the poor. In light of this, this article looks at the performance
of MFIs in Cameroon from outreach and ﬁnancial sustainability angles using data
obtained from secondary sources. The roots of microﬁnance lie in a social mission of
enhancing outreach to alleviate poverty. More recently there is a major shift in emphasis
from the social objective of poverty alleviation towards the economic objective of
sustainable and market-based ﬁnancial services (Rauf & Mahmood, 2009).
2. Microﬁnance in Cameroon
The introduction of microﬁnance in Cameroon started in 1963 by a Dutch Roman
Catholic priest Father Alfred Jansen, in Njinikom the north-west region of Cameroon.
This idea of Credit Unionism spread all over the north-west and south-west regions of
Cameroon and by 1968, 34 credit unions that were already in existence joined together
to form the Cameroon Cooperative Credit Union League (CamCCUL) Limited. CamC-
CUL is therefore the umbrella organisation of cooperative credit unions and the largest
MFI in Cameroon and the Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique Centrale
(CEMAC) sub-region (www.camccul.org). Robinson (2001) deﬁnes microﬁnance as
small-scale ﬁnancial services for both credits and deposits that are provided to people
who farm or ﬁsh or herd; operate small or micro-enterprises where goods are pro-
duced, recycled, repaired or traded, provide services, work for wages or commissions,
gain income from renting out small amounts of land, vehicles, draft animals, or
machinery and tools, and to other individuals and local groups in developing countries,
in both rural and urban areas. Microﬁnance can also be deﬁned as any activity that
includes the provision of ﬁnancial services such as credit, savings, and insurance to
low income individuals who fall just above the nationally-deﬁned poverty line, and
poor individuals who fall below that poverty line, with the goal of creating social
value (Smith, 2006).
Currently in Cameroon, urban dwellers and migrants from the rural areas make a
living from activities such as shopkeeping, street vending, farming, construction, etc.
Growth in household incomes appears more likely to be essential for long-term poverty
reduction and will be more effective if poverty alleviation programmes are targeted
disproportionately in favour of rural and semi-urban areas (Menjo, 2006).
In a country where 70% of the population depends on agriculture at a subsistence level
for their livelihood, it is clear they are in poverty. Since independence, the government of
Cameroon has embarked on several attempts aimed at promoting agricultural develop-
ment. Since 1990, the Cameroon government has embarked on various International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank programmes designed to spur business investment,
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increase agriculture, improve trade and recapitalize the nation banks (CIA.GOV, 2011).
Despite these reforms, the unemployment rate in the country stands at 34% and just about
9000 Cameroonians of the twenty million work in the public sector (cia.gov, 2011)
The concept of microcredit and microﬁnance has turned the world around as many
look at it as the main instrument for providing ﬁnancial support to the poor with the
aim of alleviating poverty and encouraging development within the poor communities.
It also aimed to reach the poorest of the poor in the ﬁght to alleviate poverty. Before
the evolution of microﬁnance, many developing countries and nations tried to eradicate
poverty by providing subsidies to small organisations and business groups, providing
free public utilities through the governments, supported by multilateral and bilateral aid
agencies (Hoff & Stiglitz, 1990). In 2009 the IMF stated that in 2006 less than 5% of
Cameroonians had bank accounts or used credit services, a lower ratio than in countries
with similar growth rates. Hence, indicating these banks served just those working in
the public sector or the very rich people within the communities.
MFIs are known worldwide to provide ﬁnancial services to the poor aimed at allevi-
ating poverty in these communities and improving the standards of living for people
who beneﬁt from these services, thereby encouraging the development of SMEs which
are of great importance towards economic growth. Ledgerwood (1999) stated the target
market for MFIs are the low income, self-employed entrepreneurs composed of small
scale traders, seamstresses, street vendors, small farmers, hairdressers, drivers, artists
and others, but as the poor are being considered as a single unit worldwide, this does
not imply that every poor community has identical ﬁnancial needs. Presently, the num-
ber of registered MFIs in Cameroon is approximately 460 with a sum amounting to over
FCFA 258 billion which has been accumulated by way of deposits from close to one
million customers (News.cameroontoday.com).
The roots of microﬁnance lie in a social mission of enhancing outreach to alleviate
poverty. More recently there has been a major shift in emphasis from the social objec-
tive of poverty alleviation towards the economic objective of sustainable and market
based ﬁnancial services (Rauf & Mahmood, 2009).
3. The concept of microﬁnance
The concept of microcredit and microﬁnance has turned the world around as many look
at it as the main instrument in providing ﬁnancial support to the poor with the aim of
alleviating poverty and encouraging development within the poor communities. Muham-
mad Yunus formally introduced microﬁnance in Bangladesh in the 1970s as a private
initiative aimed to alleviate poverty in the country. The aim was issuing small loans
($5–$100) and the target populations were the impoverished Bangladesh citizens living
in outlying rural villages (Robert, 2006). Many studies have been done to assess the
impact of microﬁnance. These studies mainly concentrate in three main areas.
The ﬁrst looks at the impact assessment of microﬁnance on the lives of the poor and
those in need of ﬁnancial services, and the socio-economic impact of microﬁnance and mi-
crocredit programmes. Do microﬁnancial services actually reduce poverty and support the
poor? Various studies have shown mixed and contradictory results. Koenraad (2002) in his
note on a microﬁnance support organisation, based in Europe, summarised key results of
some of the major ﬁndings of positive impacts as increasing the household economy and
increased economic opportunities. Major studies by Sabstad and Chen (1996) from 32
research ﬁndings on microenterprise services and primarily credit (some used a
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quasi-experimental research design), on 41 programmes from 24 countries in Asia, Africa
and Latin America with attention given to household economic security, enterprise
stability and growth, and individual control over resources found positive impacts.
The second looks at who is being served by this MFI and who are the benefactors
of these services. Is MFI serving the non-poor, the quite poor, the poor, the poorest,
etc.? With the national deﬁned poverty lines used as a benchmark to estimate the level
of poverty – the use of indicators and ratios (depth of outreach) – there is no clear tar-
get population for the MFI. Studies have indicated that majority of microﬁnance clients
are from the moderately poor household, followed by the vulnerable non-poor house-
holds and then by the extreme poor households (Sabstad & Chen, 1996). The bench-
marking index from the Micro Banking Bulletin indicates that MFIs are serving the low
end of the market is just 20% and any level below this indicates that MFIs are serving
the poorest segments (Micro Banking Bulletin). Does this means MFIs are not serving
their rightful target markets? What are the consequences of this to both the institutions
and the population?
Lastly, there is the sustainability and client satisfaction approach. Before, MFIs were
being sponsored by donors. Presently, there are reduced donors and lack of ﬁnancing to
these MFIs. Hence, they now have to undertake the mission of poverty eradication and eco-
nomic growth on their own basis. Some people belief these MFIs can survive without
donors while others feel these MFIs depend solely on these donors to successfully complete
their goals. Hence, the question is, can these MFIs operate independently without the sup-
port of donors while also satisfying their clients’ ﬁnancial needs? (Basu & Woller, 2004).
4. Conceptual framework
Various rating institutions and performance rating methods have been used to analysis
the MFIs since no clear existing requirements exist for these institutions. Most of the
rating systems used try to provide a complete picture of the ﬁnancial aspects of these
institutions as they strive for transparency and as it is difﬁcult to evaluate the social per-
formance of the MFIs. In addition to these ﬁnancial performance indicators drawn from
these rating systems, this study also tries to look at the social indicators from the out-
reach perspective. Those MFIs with little or no donors rely on the ﬁnancial sustainabil-
ity of the organisation hence are more focused on the ﬁnancial performance of the MFI
with little effort given to ﬁnding out if they are serving the right target group or effec-
tively upholding the main mission. On the other hand, MFIs with donors are more con-
cerned with the social indicators and achievements of these organisations. This has lead
to aggressive competition and lending policies of MFIs create a debt burden resulting in
tensions, conﬂicts, violence and even suicide within households and communities
(Rahman, 1999). McIntosh, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2005), showed that wealthier
borrowers are likely to beneﬁt from increasing competition among MFIs, but that it
leads to lower levels of welfare for the poorer borrowers. Therefore, the recent shift of
MFIs to progress from small, money-losing operations to large providers of banking
services on a more sustainable and commercial basis may go against the traditional aim
of MFIs, which is to provide credit to the poor.
Olivares-Polanco (2005) investigates the determinants of outreach in terms of the
loan size of MFIs, using data from 28 MFIs in Latin America for the years 1999–2001.
The analysis includes only one observation for each MFI in the data-set. Using simple
ordinary least squares (OLS), Olivares-Polanco’s study conﬁrms the existence of a
trade-off between sustainability and outreach.
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In Africa, many studies on outreach and performance had been done in some coun-
tries. Kereta (2007), looked at MFIs performance in Ethiopia from outreach and ﬁnan-
cial sustainability angles using data from primary and secondary sources. The results
indicated that outreach rose from 2003 to 2007 by an average of 22.9% and the reach
to women is limited to just 38.4% and also indicated that MFIs in the country are ﬁnan-
cially sustainable. He concluded that there was no trade-off between ﬁnancial sustain-
ability and outreach within the country.
Recent years have seen the need for a precise rating system for evaluating and com-
paring MFIs. Some of these metrics focus mostly on the performance aspect of the
MFIs with very little information on the social and management standards. Most of
these rating methods help donors and investors in these microﬁnancial markets to evalu-
ate these ﬁrms. Leaving out the social and outreach aspects does not give a complete
picture of this sector.
5. Data and methodology
Various institutions and performance rating methods have been used to analyse the MFIs
since no clear existing requirements exist for these institutions. Most of the rating systems
used try to provide a complete picture of the ﬁnancial aspects of these institutions as they
strive for transparency and it is difﬁcult to evaluate the social performance of the MFIs.
This study used an extension from the Pankaj and Sinha model where they analysed
companies on six categories of ﬁnancial performance (Financial Structure, Revenue,
Expenses, Efﬁciency, Productivity and Risk). We have decided to include the seventh
parameter (Outreach) which measures the outreach of these MFIs in Cameroon.
Agarwal and Sinha (2010) evaluated the ﬁnancial performance of MFIs in India. In this
approach, they used the difference of means test to compare the performances of these
MFIs. They considered α=0.5.
The Mix Market is the most reliable international database available for MFIs. They
classify MFIs into star categories based on their performance, sustainability and social
indicators. We have chosen ratios for this analysis from the Mix Market database from
six major MFIs in Cameroon. The six MFIs used in this study namely Cameroon
Co-operative Credit Union League, Ltd (CamCUL), Crédit Communautaire d’Afrique
(CCA), Crédit du Sahel (CDS), Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit des Artisans du
Wouri (CECAW), Réseau MC2 (MC2) and Societe Financiere Africaine (SOFINA). The
data was analysed using EXCEL 2010. This was panel data for the six major MFIs in
Cameroon from 2007 to 2009.
6. Data analysis
The main focus will be analysing the means of each ratio based on the selected core
indicators for each of the seven categories of ﬁnance performance and outreach for these
institutions against the benchmarks indicators for Africa MFIs in 2009. For various cate-
gories, the analysis is as follows:
7. Financial structure
Table 1 presents the ﬁnancial structure statistics. Capital to Asset ratio: The p value
(α=0.000008) is signiﬁcant and can be concluded that the MFIs in Cameroon operate
with some risky management policies.
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Debt/Equity Ratio: There is no signiﬁcant difference between the MFIs in Cameroon
and Africa (α = 0.12 > 0.05). They all depend on commercial funds for their activities.
Deposits to Loans: The p value is signiﬁcant here again, indicating the MFIs in
Cameroon depend heavily on deposits as the source of funds. There are little or no
donors in Cameroon to ﬁnance these MFIs.
Deposits to Total Assets: There is a signiﬁcant difference between the ratio for Cam-
eroon and the African benchmark. This is in line with the previous analysis.
8. Overall performance
Return on Assets: we may observe that the MFIs in Cameroon generate a lesser return
on their assets as compared to the African benchmark as they put in desperate measures
to generate returns from capital (Table 2).
Return on Equity: the return on equity for these ﬁrms all over Africa including
Cameroon is identical. This is also reﬂected in operational self sufﬁciency where p
value is not signiﬁcant. The identical Debt to Equity ratio supports this fact as these
ﬁrms in Cameroon, though being more risky, are able to sustain themselves on their
operations.
9. Revenue
There is a signiﬁcant difference for both the ﬁnancial revenue and proﬁt margin for the
Cameroon MFIs and the African benchmark (Table 3). The Cameroon MFIs have far
more less ﬁnancial revenue and proﬁt. The MFIs in Cameroon are following unique
business models for survival.
10. Expenses
In the case of expenses, the MFIs in Cameroon seem to be incurring fewer expenses
compared to the benchmark. The total expense to asset ratio is signiﬁcantly different as
the mean is higher for the benchmark compared with the Cameroon MFIs. The ﬁnancial
Table 2. Overall performance mean analysis.
ROA ROE OSS
Mean –0.4675 –17.59 96.8475
Standard error 1.107715178 22.71482961 8.259986204
Median 0.555 5.135 104.345
Standard deviation 4.430860714 90.85931844 33.03994481
Sample variance 19.63252667 8255.415747 1091.637953
Kurtosis 14.15860635 15.54084277 4.680623207
Skewness –3.660250047 –3.919096103 –2.188436645
Range 19.65 382.53 128.22
Minimum –16.67 –356.28 1.88
Maximum 2.98 26.25 130.1
Sum –7.48 –281.44 1549.56
Count 16 16 16
African benchmark 3.2 18.5 97.1
P value 0.002375906 0.066475086 0.488008125
Source: Authors calculation.
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expenses and loan loss provision expense are not signiﬁcant as they all seem to be
incurring the same cost on debt (Table 4).
11. Efﬁciency
We can see that the p value is not signiﬁcant for the operating expense as a percentage
of loan portfolios (Table 5). This may be due to the fact that the MFIs all over Africa
follow the same or similar business and operation models. There is a signiﬁcant differ-
ence between the mean for the cost per borrower. This may be due to the fact that the
loan sizes differ from country to country within Africa.
12. Productivity
As expected, the p value is insigniﬁcant for borrowers per staff. As they have similar
managerial systems. While for the depositors per staff, it is highly signiﬁcant. There are
Table 3. Revenue means analysis.
FR PM
Mean 15.759375 –2.49875
Standard error 2.207433175 9.659794075
Median 12.285 4.18
Standard deviation 8.829732702 38.6391763








African benchmark 26.7 36.2
P value 0.000086 0.000572433
Source: Authors calculation.
Table 4. Expenses mean analysis.
TE/A FE/A PLL/A
Mean 16.6325 3.55875 1.754
Standard error 2.618733552 0.597383793 0.824903342
Median 12.49 2.865 0.61
Standard deviation 10.47493421 2.389535171 3.194836906
Sample variance 109.7242467 5.709878333 10.20698286
Kurtosis –0.848264493 2.320313058 7.53002511
Skewness 0.907922278 1.580215772 2.766356985
Range 29.22 8.74 11.79
Minimum 6.12 1.13 0
Maximum 35.34 9.87 11.79
Sum 266.12 56.94 26.31
Count 16 16 15
African benchmark 29.6 3.3 2.6
P value 0.000086 0.335538902 0.14182972
Source: Authors calculation.
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fewer depositors per staff in Cameroon MFIs (Table 6). This may be due to the fact that
the Cameroon MFIs are not fully utilising the available manpower as the population is
still scared of the weak ﬁnancial sector in the country
13. Risk management
There is a signiﬁcant difference in the case of future bad debts and risk coverage
(Table 7). This shows that the Cameroon MFIs operate under very risky conditions
compared to the benchmark. There was no signiﬁcant difference for loan loss reserve
and write off ratio. Risk avoidance measures are taken but this does not guarantees loss
prevention.
Table 5. Efﬁciency mean analysis.
OE/LP C/B
Mean 24.19 145.1428571
Standard error 4.986370925 28.6208364
Median 16.235 103
Standard deviation 19.9454837 107.0893639








African benchmark 23.8 202
P value 0.469346142 0.034233165
Source: Authors calculation.
Table 6. Productivity means analysis.
B/S D/S
Mean 105.0666667 202.9333333
Standard error 20.45633367 32.45956703
Median 81 185
Standard deviation 79.22703964 125.7153625








African benchmark 123 328
P value 0.197731601 0.000878564
Source: Authors calculation.
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14. Outreach
Despite having almost the same gross loan portfolio as the mean benchmark for other
African MFIs, the MFIs in Cameroon have failed to serve the needy population of Cam-
eroon. With signiﬁcant differences and lesser means for the number of active borrowers,
the percentage of women borrows and number of depositors (Table 8).
15. Conclusion
We may conclude that the MFIs in Cameroon follow a different management model in
comparison with most MFIs in Africa. These organisations in Cameroon are not doing
well with regards to the return on their assets and it can also be noticed that their
ﬁnancing depends solely on the deposits made by their clients. This is supported by the
fact that these MFIs in Cameroon do not depend on external sponsors and international
ﬁnancial support. These institutions in Cameroon, though being more risky, are able to
sustain themselves and their operations.
It is clear that MFIs in Cameroon do not manage their risk well. Hence, they operate
under very high risk. They are very open to default risk.
A closer look at the outreach aspect can tell us that these institutions are limited in
terms of outreach. They have very limited branches in the rural communities and are
heavily centralised in the urban centres. They are targeting the SMEs in the urban cen-
tres and just 28% of the female population in the country beneﬁt from these services.
16. Recommendation
From the ﬁndings, we have to acknowledge the fact that this is still a fresh development
within the country with lack of donors and sponsors; these institutions are caught in a
trade-off; to reach out to the target population (the poorest of the poor) or they make prof-
its and are sustainable. From a marketing point of view, a greater market share is often
Table 7. Risk management mean analysis.
PAR>30 PAR>90 LLR RC WOL
Mean 16.94076923 13.22846154 3.534 47.28153846 3.334545455
Standard error 3.27747019 2.759189273 1.809777273 7.269034945 1.65809604
Median 17.1 11 0.825 35.97 0.83
Standard
deviation
11.81708682 9.948398402 5.72301824 26.20887822 5.499282433
Sample
variance
139.643541 98.97063077 32.75293778 686.9052974 30.24210727
Kurtosis –1.073282218 –1.063918212 5.498894442 –1.403611862 6.05410372
Skewness 0.375993268 0.517470734 2.313883869 0.217439187 2.408717055
Range 34.61 29.26 18.29 74.35 18.29
Minimum 2.03 2.03 0 11.54 0
Maximum 36.64 31.29 18.29 85.89 18.29
Sum 220.23 171.97 35.34 614.66 36.68
Count 13 13 10 13 11
African
benchmark
9.9 5.9 2.7 118.4 3.3
P value 0.026404801 0.010472428 0.327926785 2.2666E-07 0.491893801
Source: Authors calculation.
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translated into increased proﬁtability (Hasin, Seeluangsawat, & Shareef, 2001; Jacoby &
Chesnut, 1978). With well-implemented strategies to minimise operating costs, reaching
out for a larger market share should be their main target. The needy population who could
be ever loyal to the services of these institutions is in the rural communities. More women
should be targeted and served. The government should increase the subsidies and support
to these communities they are working towards their objectives.
Lastly, foreign sponsors and donors should come in and help these marginal institu-
tions work towards better services to the Cameroonian population.
17. Limitations
This study has selected six MFIs with data in the Mix Market database. Future studies
should include more institutions. This should present a better picture if the sample size
is larger. Secondly, data for just three years was analysed for each institution. Further
studies should include many more years of data for each institution.
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